articlelarge Earlier today, I happened to be looking back at a post I wrote three months ago, casting the iPod Touch as “Apple’s game-changer”. Today in the New York Times, Jenna Wortham wrote that “Apple’s game-changer” is something else: the entire App Store concept.

“[Before the App Store came about, it] took six to nine months to build a relationship with a carrier, maybe a quarter-million to get the infrastructure built, and the company took 50 percent or more from each dollar,” [Flurry marketing executive Peter] Farago says, a process that limited access to mobile platforms. “Apple has helped create a much healthier middle class of developers and expanded the pie for everyone.”

This fairly lengthy article looks in depth at not only Apple’s App Store, but the stores (current or coming) of its competitors—Blackberry, Palm, Android, and Windows.

It is not uniformly positive in its outlook, either. It notes Apple’s reputation for a difficult approval process, as well as the difficulty of finding any one specific app when there are over 100,000 available. It likewise points out the flaws in the other stores, as well as their benefits.

As much as I think the term “game changer” is by and large overused, it may be apt in this case. Not only is Apple’s App Store something special for the iPhone, but the success of the idea has sparked imitation in all of its major competitors. The smartphone landscape has been altered irrevocably.

Or, if you will, the game has been changed.

2 COMMENTS

  1. Not sure I buy this, although it seems to be the common wisdom these days. I think the press is suffering from a bit of amnesia, and perhaps mid-identifying the real innovations.

    There were large numbers of PalmOS ‘apps’ available from online stores years ago, and I seem to recall they could even be downloaded direct to the later devices (e.g. the Treo). So what’s really different about Apple’s store? Well, in addition to better PR, Apple has:

    1. a much more capable platform (better graphics, location services, motion sensors, etc.). there are whole classes of applications that just weren’t practical on a handheld in Palm’s heyday.

    2. an already established ‘store’, with billing arrangements already set up for many customers.

    3. much lower prices (PalmOS apps tended to be priced like desktop software, i.e. $20-$40, not $0-$10).

    4. less fragmented – there’s one store, rather than several.

    To me, it looks as though the two main improvements are pricing, and an easier, more familiar buying experience (leveraging the existing iTMS). But those relatively incremental improvements have made a huge difference in customer acceptance (just as the iPod improved on earlier MP3 players…).

    There’s also the black art of getting developer mindshare, in which Apple’s had good luck (or good timing). The new Palm WebOS doesn’t seem to be taking off in this respect (so far), although Android may be doing so. That’s tough to replicate, whereas pricing and ease-of-purchase are relatively easy (although lots of companies still mess up in those areas).

  2. Part of where this article goes wrong is that it primarily compares the Apple App Store to the “walled gardens” of cell-phone carriers. It’s missing the older (more open) Palm ecosystem. Although to be fair, I don’t think that was ever much of a ‘mass market’, so the omission may be reasonable.

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